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文章来源：《经济学人》Nov 19th 2022 期 Leaders 栏目
Europe faces an enduring crisis of energy and geopolitics
欧洲面临着持久的能源和地缘政治危机
Frozen out
This will weaken it and threaten its global position
这将削弱它，威胁它的全球地位
Nov 24th 2022
If you ask Europe’s friends around the world what they think of the old continent’s prospects they often respond with two emotions. One is admiration. In the struggle to help Ukraine and resist Russian aggression, Europe has displayed unity, grit and a principled willingness to bear enormous costs. But the second is alarm. A brutal economic squeeze will pose a test of Europe’s resilience in 2023 and beyond. There is a growing fear that the recasting of the global energy system, American economic populism and geopolitical rifts threaten the long-run competitiveness of the European Union and non-members, including Britain. It is not just the continent’s prosperity that is at risk, the health of the transatlantic alliance is, too.
如果你问世界各地的欧洲朋友，他们如何看待这个古老大陆的前景，他们的回答通常带有两种情绪。一个是钦佩。在帮助乌克兰和抵抗俄罗斯侵略的斗争中，欧洲表现出了团结、勇气和承担巨大代价的原则性意愿。但第二个是担忧。残酷的经济紧缩将在2023年及以后对欧洲的弹性构成考验。人们越来越担心，全球能源体系的重塑、美国的经济民粹主义和地缘政治分歧会威胁到欧盟和包括英国在内的非欧盟成员国的长期竞争力。不仅欧洲大陆的繁荣面临威胁，跨大西洋联盟的健康也面临威胁。
Don’t be fooled by the rush of good news from Europe in the past few weeks. Energy prices are down from the summer and a run of good weather means that gas storage is nearly full. But the energy crisis still poses dangers. Gas prices are six times higher than their long-run average. On November 22nd Russia threatened to throttle the last operational pipeline to Europe, even as missile attacks caused emergency power cuts across Ukraine. Europe’s gas storage will need to be refilled once again in 2023, this time without any piped Russian gas whatsoever.
不要被过去几周从欧洲传来的一连串好消息所迷惑。能源价格从夏季开始下降，而连续的好天气意味着天然气储备接近饱和。但能源危机仍构成威胁。天然气价格比长期平均价格水平高出六倍。11月22日，俄罗斯威胁要切断通往欧洲的最后一条运转的输气管，当时导弹袭击导致乌克兰全境紧急断电。到2023年，欧洲的天然气储备将需要再次补充，这一次没有任何来自俄罗斯的管道天然气。
Vladimir Putin’s energy weapon will exact a toll beyond Ukraine. Our modelling suggests that, in a normal winter, a 10% rise in real energy prices is associated with a 0.6% increase in deaths. Hence the energy crunch this year could cause over 100,000 extra deaths of elderly people across Europe. If so, Mr Putin’s energy weapon could take more lives outside Ukraine than his artillery, missiles and drones do directly within it. That is one more reason why Ukraine’s resistance to Russia is Europe’s fight, too.
弗拉基米尔•普京的能源武器将造成乌克兰以外的损失。我们的模型表明，在一个正常的冬季，实际能源价格上涨10%，死亡人数就会增加0.6%。因此，今年的能源危机可能会导致整个欧洲额外10万老年人死亡。如果是这样的话，普京的能源武器在乌克兰境外夺走的生命可能比他的火炮、导弹和无人机直接在乌克兰境内夺走的生命还要多。这也是为什么乌克兰对俄罗斯的抵抗也是欧洲的斗争的另一个原因。
The war is also creating financial vulnerabilities. Energy inflation is spilling over into the rest of Europe’s economy, creating an acute dilemma for the European Central Bank. It needs to raise interest rates to control prices. But if it goes too far it could destabilise the euro zone’s weaker members, not least indebted Italy.
战争还造成了金融脆弱性。能源通胀正蔓延到欧洲其他经济领域，这令欧洲央行陷入两难境地。它需要提高利率来控制价格。但如果它“用力过猛”，可能会破坏欧元区较弱成员国的稳定，尤其是负债累累的意大利。
Even as the energy crisis rages, the war has exposed a vulnerability in Europe’s business model. Too many of Europe’s industrial firms, especially German ones, have relied on abundant energy inputs from Russia. Plenty of companies have also become more dependent on another [], China, as an end market. The prospect of severed relations with Russia, structurally higher costs and [] has meant a reckoning in many boardrooms.
在能源危机肆虐之际，这场战争也暴露出欧洲商业模式的一个弱点。太多的欧洲工业企业，尤其是德国企业，依赖俄罗斯丰富的能源输入。许多公司也变得更加依赖另一个国家，即中国，作为终端市场。与俄罗斯切断联系的前景、结构性的高成本以及[.]意味着许多公司的董事会要进行“清算”。
That fear has been amplified by America’s economic nationalism which threatens to draw activity across the Atlantic in a whirlwind of subsidies and protectionism. President Joe Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act involves $400bn of handouts for energy, manufacturing and transport and includes make-in-America provisions. In many ways the scheme resembles the industrial policies that China has pursued for decades. As the other two pillars of the world economy become more A and B, Europe, with its quaint insistence on upholding World Trade Organisation rules on free trade, looks like a sucker.
【1】interventionist
【2】protectionist这种担忧被美国的经济民族主义放大了，这种民族主义可能会在补贴和保护主义的旋风中吸引大西洋彼岸的活动。美国总统乔•拜登的《通货膨胀削减法案》涉及4000亿美元的能源、制造业和运输业补贴，其中包括“美国制造”条款。在许多方面，该计划与中国几十年来推行的产业政策相似。随着世界经济的另外两大支柱变得更加A和保B，坚持维护世界贸易组织自由贸易规则的欧洲看起来倒像个傻瓜。
Already, companies are reacting to the subsidies. Northvolt, a prized Swedish battery startup, has said that it wants to expand production in America. Iberdrola, a Spanish energy company, is investing twice as much in America as in the European Union. Many bosses warn that the combination of expensive energy and American subsidies leaves Europe at risk of mass deindustrialisation. BASF, a German chemicals giant, recently unveiled plans to shrink its European operations “permanently”. It does not help that Europe is ageing faster than America, too.
企业已经开始对补贴做出反应。瑞典备受赞誉的电池初创企业Northvolt表示，它希望扩大在美国的生产。西班牙能源公司Iberdrola在美国的投资是在欧盟的两倍。许多老板警告说，昂贵的能源加上美国的补贴，使欧洲面临大规模去工业化的风险。德国化工巨头巴斯夫最近公布了“永久”缩减其欧洲业务的计划。欧洲人口老龄化速度也比美国快，这也于事无补。
Losing investment makes Europe poorer and feeds into a sense of declining economic vigour. Compared with its pre-covid gdp trajectory, Europe has done worse than any other economic bloc. Of the world’s 100 most valuable firms, only 14 are European. Politicians will be tempted to chuck out the rule book and respond with subsidies of their own in an escalating arms race of corporate goodies. Germany’s economy minister has accused America of “hoovering up investments”. President Emmanuel Macron of France has called for “a European wake-up”.
失去投资使欧洲更加贫穷，加剧了经济活力下降的感觉。与新冠疫情前的GDP轨迹相比，欧洲的表现比任何其他经济集团都要糟糕。在全球100家最有价值的公司中，只有14家是欧洲公司。政客们很可能会抛弃规则，以自己的补贴作为回应，展开一场不断升级的企业产品军备竞赛。德国经济部长指责美国“攫取投资”。法国总统埃马纽埃尔·马克龙呼吁“欧洲觉醒”。
Thus the subsidy row is also feeding tensions between America and Europe. America’s financial and military support for Ukraine vastly exceeds Europe’s, and as it pivots to Asia to meet the challenge from [], America resents the eu’s failure to pay for its own security. Most members of nato have failed to meet the goal of spending 2% of gdp on defence. The eu was staggeringly naive about Russian aggression. Although the war caused America and Europe to unite after the ruptures of the Trump years, the danger is that a long conflict and economic tensions will gradually pull them apart again. [删了一句]
因此，补贴之争也加剧了美国和欧洲之间的紧张关系。美国对乌克兰的财政和军事支持远远超过了欧洲，随着美国转向亚洲应对来自[]的挑战，美国对欧盟未能为自己的安全买单感到不满。大多数北约成员国都未能实现将GDP的2%用于国防的目标。对于俄罗斯的侵略，欧盟幼稚得惊人。尽管在特朗普时代破裂之后，这场战争促使美国和欧洲团结起来，但危险在于，长期冲突和经济紧张局势将逐渐使它们再次分裂。
To avoid a dangerous rift, America must see the bigger picture. Mr Biden’s protectionism threatens to drain Europe of vitality even as America props up Ukraine’s army, and armadas of tankers cross the Atlantic to supply Europe’s energy. The chief aim of Bidenomics is to stop [] dominating key industries: America has no strategic interest in siphoning European investment. It should make European firms eligible for its energy subsidies, and integrate transatlantic energy markets more deeply.
为了避免危险的分歧，美国必须看到更大的前景。当美国支持乌克兰军队，油轮舰队跨越大西洋为欧洲提供能源，拜登的保护主义可能会耗尽欧洲的活力。“拜登经济学”的主要目的是阻止[]主导关键行业: 吸纳欧洲投资对美国没有战略利益。它应该让欧洲公司有资格获得其能源补贴，并更深入地整合跨大西洋能源市场。
Europe, meanwhile, needs to protect its economy against the energy squeeze. Schemes that rightly aim to subsidise consumers and firms for their basic energy needs should curb demand by charging higher prices at the margin, as in Germany. To lower long-run energy prices Europe should accelerate the renewables revolution, while keeping energy markets open to competition. It also needs to adapt to a new security reality. That means spending more on defence so that it can take up the burden as America shifts its gaze towards Asia.
与此同时，欧洲需要保护其经济不受能源短缺的影响。那些旨在补贴消费者和企业基本能源需求的计划应该像德国那样，通过提高边际价格来抑制需求。为了降低长期能源价格，欧洲应该加快可再生能源革命，同时保持能源市场的开放竞争。它还需要适应新的安全现实。这意味着在国防上投入更多，以便在美国将目光转向亚洲时能够承担这一负担。
Besides admiration and alarm, the other emotion governing transatlantic relations is frustration. America is irritated by Europe’s economic torpor and its failure to defend itself; Europe is outraged by America’s economic populism. But just as Europe must not be divided by the war, so it is vital that the most powerful democratic alliance in history adapts—and endures. ■
除了钦佩和担忧，主导大西洋两岸关系的另一种情绪是沮丧。美国对欧洲经济的迟钝和未能自卫感到恼怒; 欧洲被美国的经济民粹主义激怒了。但正如欧洲不能因战争而分裂一样，历史上最强大的民主联盟适应并持续下去也至关重要。■ |
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发表于 2022-12-22 19:52:16
